![]() Harris DW (2019) We talk to people, not contexts. Grice HP (1989) Studies in the way of words. Genovesi C (2020) Metaphor and what is meant: metaphorical content, what is said, and contextualism. Ontos verlag, London, pp 9–41ĭavidson D (1978) What metaphors mean. In: Stalmaszczyk P (ed) Philosophy of language and linguistics: the philosophical turn, vol 2. Oxford University Press, OxfordĬorazza E, Korta K (2010) Minimalism, contextualism, and contentualism. Ĭorazza E (2004) Reflecting the mind: indexicality and quasi-indexicality. Midwest Stud Philos 33:107–130Ĭarston R (2010) XIII Metaphor: ad hoc concepts, literal meaning and mental images. Ĭamp E (2009) Two varieties of literary imagination: metaphor, fiction, and thought experiments. Ĭamp E (2008) Showing, telling and seeing: metaphor and “poetic” language. Ĭamp E (2006b) Metaphor and that certain “je ne sais quoi.” Philos Stud 129(1):1–25. University of California, BerkeleyĬamp E (2006a) Contextualism, metaphor, and what is said. Ĭamp E (2003) Saying and seeing-as: the linguistic uses and cognitive effects of metaphor. īowdle BF, Gentner D (2005) The career of metaphor. Nous 12(1):3–16īezuidenhout A (2001) Metaphor and what is said: a defense of a direct expression view of metaphor. Acta Hum Unv Saulensis 8:422–427īeardsley MC (1962) The metaphorical twist. īarnes A (2009) Aristotle and Paul Ricoeur on the metpahor: the rhetoric of renaming. Birner and Gregory Ward (eds.), pp 21–30. ![]() In Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning: Neo-Gricean studies in pragmatics and semantics in honor of Laurence R. Dover Publications, Mineolaīach K (2006) The top 10 misconceptions about implicature. Dover Publications, MineolaĪristotle (2004) Rhetoric. Differences between prosaic and poetic metaphors roughly correspond to the level of content triggering an inference to metaphorical meaning.Īristotle (1997) Poetics. They range from the purely reflexive to referential content thereby constituting a family of gradually less reflexive and more contextually independent contents. The truth-conditions of these contents are classified by different contents some of these contents are reflexive and have the utterance itself as a constituent. Namely, that every utterance is systematically associated with a family of contents. I attempt to square these seemingly disparate observations by developing an idea in Korta and Perry’s Critical Pragmatics (2011). On this picture, metaphors are patently pragmatic. Some other authors have observed that metaphorical utterances (i.e., poetic, novel metaphors) seem to behave more like paradigmatic conversational implicatures, and so are conversationally meant. ![]() If metaphors are interpreted along the same lines as literally loose speech, metaphorical content is part of what a speaker says, and is classified as semantic. ![]() Contextualists have argued that metaphorical utterances (i.e., prosaic/conventional metaphors) behave like literally loose uses of speech in that they are interpreted automatically and unreflectively. This article aims to contribute to ongoing debate on the place of metaphor at the semantics/pragmatics interface. ![]()
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